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J..ntrodu~tion 
lt does not take a close study of modern literature to 
discover that Western Civilization is under~oing a tremendous 
upheaval in all aspects of its exiatence. J.n almoat every major 
literary work of the last seventy-five years we experience lonely, 
fearful, and crippled beings wandering in search of some human 
values by which to live. 
furthermore the portrayal of theae dark struggles are 
creations not only of the European mind which has auffered through 
the atrocities of two wars, but is also witnessed in many of 
the major works comin~ from America, a country which has prided 
itself on ita optimism and hope. 
We find that the picture of man preeented in Arthur Miller, 
Tennessee Williams, William Faulkner, and Erneat Hemingway is 
clearly similar to that presented in the works of Kafka, Camus, 
Dostoevsky, Joyce, and Sartre. 1 This similarity in theme has 
caused an American critic, Richard Lehan, to examine what he 
2 
calls "affinity of mind or spirit" between £uropean and American 
writers, Lehan charact.eri~c• t.hia. affinity ahared by Acuerican 
and European writers as a concern "with the meaning of identi~y 
in the ,uodern world, the nature of good and evil, the poasil>ility 
of fulfillment in contemporary aoc·iety, the source of value in 
a world without God, and the possibility and meaning of action 
in an ethical vacuum. t 'he new American hero is similar to the 
l 
2 
French existential hero becauae he share•• comaon world and 
3 
a similar world view.ft 
This common world view has developed since World War ll 
into the philosophic and artistic movement known generally•• 
existentialism. Using specifically the thought coming fro• 
the literature of the last seventy~five years, existential 
.t .td.nkers have developed a view of man and exiet;ence which 
questions and opposes the direction in which the modern world 
is moving. 
Existential thinkers such as Jean Paul Sartre and Albert 
Camus have stated that man'• existence in the world ia abaurd. 
By this they mean that existence precede• eeaence. Man finds 
himself and the world in existence, and only then can he attempt 
to make any meaning out of this situation. Consequently the 
existentialists believe that at the core of existence there 
lies a meaninglessness or at best an incomprehensible mystery 
which can never be understood through reaaon. The existentialists 
therefore view man's belief in a rational and scientifically 
explained reality as only a fearful attempt to eacape from 
this meaninglessness and the abysa of death which underlies 
it. They contend that only by first facing and coming to terms 
with this condition can man find an authentic and meaningful 
life instead of the dull and empty routine which they find 
dominant in modern society. 
What i hope to do in thia paper by examinin& the works 
of Hemingway ia to show the elements in Hemingway's work which 
can clearly be identified as existential and alao to show, 
J 
as John Killinger states, "that the similarities in their world 
view are due not to collaboration but to living in the same 
'l ' n4 m1. 1.eu. This will be done by comparing certain attitudes 
and values common to both Hemin&way's fiction and to the writings 
of existential thinkers. These areas will include the presence 
and awareness of death, the necessity of freedom, the n~ed 
for courage, and the problem of social action. 
Because in the course of this paper reference will often 
be made to the works of existential philosophers, 1 think it 
will be helpful to begin with a brief discussion of the prob-
lems and concepts with which exiatential·iam deals. l hope by 
doing this to lay a "roundwork for the analysis of Hemingway'• 
work as it is related to existentialism. 
All modern exiatential philosophy revolve• around one 
basic queation. What is the meanina of human exiatence? 
Perbapa a~ fi~at ~hia aee~• not t,o be a very unique quea~ioa 
for philosopher• to aak. However, the peculiarity of thia 
question ia aeen more clearly when we compare the poaition 
of existential philoaophy and the definition of man which it 
impliea with that of traditional Weatern philoaophy culminating 
with scientific rationaliaa. 
The eaaential difference between existentialiam and tradi-
tional Weatern philosophy center• around the relationship 
between reason end exiateoce. Thia relationship haa been suc-
cinctly expreased by Willia• 2arrett in the followin&: 
llut the belief in a completely rational coamoa 
lies behin~ the Weatern philoeophic-tradition; 
at the very dawn of thia tradit~on Parmenidea 
•~ated in hi• faaoua verae, "lt ia the aaae 
thing that can be thouaht and that can be." 
What canno~ be theuaht, Paraenides held, cannot 
be real. If existence cannot be thou&ht, but 
only lived, then reaaoa haa .oo. other recouree 
than to leave exi•tence out of ite picture of 
reality.5 
Tho purpose then of eAiateotialiaa ie to reinatate the 
au.bject of human exiateoce, in all ita concreteneaa, back into 
the center of philoaophy. lo order to facilitate thia reio-
atateaent exiatentialiat• have attacked both traditional philo-
aophy and acientific rationali- •• beiq a threat. to aan'• 
freedom becauae of the obaea•ion with reaaon and ita . . attuapta 
4 
s 
to conetruct a ayatem which can rationally explain the cosmos. 
The reeult of this obaesaion with the rational haa been, in 
traditional philoeophy, a definition of man which posits aan•a 
eaaence in a di~ension beyond hia e~istence and in scientific 
rationalism a definition of human existence in which man is 
reduced to an object-like atatus -whose behavior is predictable 
in accordance with lawa similar to tho•e which ~vern other 
objects. ' . .. 
The exiat.ential view of aao, however, is diametrically 
opposed to bot..h of. these viewa. The exiatentialiat aees man 
as a free and creative consctousneaa aain~ainina a unique 
i . ,, 
place in the universe. William V. Spanos states in the intro-
duction to his book on exiateotialiaa: 
Aa a eelf~cooecioua,that ia free creature, aan 
constitutea a minority in a coamoe governed by 
natural law. From a . rational point of view, 
then, he6 ia by virtue of hia consciouanesa an anoaaly. 
The behavioral view of existence, aay the exiatentialiata, 
means apiritual suicide for man. ln effect, it calla on aan 
to give up hia uni~e consciouaneaa and become object-like. 
Aa a reault the exiatential thinkera have attacked this view 
of man and the society which it haa created. 
la order to juatify their view of lllal'l and to undermine 
the rationalistic behavioral view the existentiali•t• began 
by explorina the human condition in the modern world. They 
began thia exploration by &oinc back to the writinaa of Soren 
Kierkegaard and &.iedrioh Kietal'c.he. 'these men, aaid the exia-
tentialiata, were prophets proclaillli.ng that man waa spiritually 
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diaeaaed and foretelling a coming crisis unles8 there was 
a turning away fro• the obsession with reason and• return 
to the struggle to regain the vitality of existence. Mietzache 
and Kierkegaard declared that man had lost touch with all that 
was vital and sacred ahout being and that he had lost the cour-
age to face and accept. existence wi t.h all its hazards, myetery, 
and uncertainty. Nietzsche expresses ·thi$ feeling wh~n he speaks 
of the reaction to the · death of God:· 
At last the horizon see•• open once more, 
grantinc eYen that it i• not bright; our 
ships can at last put out to sea in face of 
every dange1•; every hazard ia a-cain permitted 
to the discerner; the sea, our sea, again lies 
open before ua; perhapa oeve~ before did auch 
an open sea exist.7 
Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God and the free-
dom which it implied marked a beginning point for existential 
thinkers of the atheiatic mode. God waa dead. He had been 
killed by human indifference and by man's belief in rational 
science and the security it promised. Man, however, ~ust not 
kill the theistic God only to replace Him by the secular god 
of reason. for Nietzsche, man must now become superman. He 
must transform himself into the man-god. 
If Nietzeche can be considered the precurt10r of atheistic 
existentialia•, Soren Kierke&aard is the tether or theistic 
existentiali••· Kierkegaard also saw the necessity for a 
revitalization and a reawakening of man to the vital nature 
of his being. 6ut unlike Nietzache, Kierkegaard did not see 
the path to thie coal in the death of God, but rather through 
the affirmation of God through a leap of faith. For the theiatic 
1 
exiatentialiat God is not dead, but he cannot be known through 
reason or intellect. · williaa Spanos atate• the difference 
between theiatic and atheistic exietentialiaa in thi• ways 
For the Christian, on the other hand, God ia 
not dead; He is rationally incomprehensible; 
that ia, He is absent. Thua man•a -treedoa 
becomes the dreadful awareness of the necessity 
to chooae between a life of despair in the realm 
of Nothingneaa and a life of precarious joy in 
the reala which to the eapirical eye appears 
aeaningleaa, but to the eye of faith constitute• 
on the aicrocoamic level a reconciliation between 
exiatence and essence and on the macrocosmic 
level (in the words of T.S. Eliot'• Four Qua~teta) 
an interaection of the tiaelesa with ~time •• -
Thia ia the leap of faith about which Kierkegaard apeaks. 
lt ia a leap which carries the theistic existentialist 
beyond the atheistic position to a aore positive perspective 
although one which ia equally difficult to maintain. Accom-
panying this affirmation of faith however is the experience 
of dread. A man muat experience dread becauae, maintains 
Kierkegaard, only through the experience of dread can a man 
go beyond his finite and worldly aims to achieve freedom. 
As Kierkegaard atatea: 
Dread is the possibility of freedom. Only 
this dread ia by the aid of faith absolutely 
educative, laying bare as it does all finite 
aims and discovering all their deceptions ••• 
He who ie educated by dread is educated by 
possibility, and only the man who ia educated 
by poaaibilitJ ia educated in accordance with 
his infinity. 
-
To sum up then, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are considered 
the forerunners of modern existentialism because they were the 
first in the modern age to realize that Western man had lost 
touch with the concreteness of his exiatence. Both believed 
that the more man became obsessed with reason and rational 
science the more he wou d lose touch with the richness of 
human experience. Reason and science were for the weak willed; 
for those who wanted the safety of quiet discourse rather than 
the adventure and danger of the open sea. Kierke aard states: 
In our time it is especially the natural 
sciences which are dangerous. Physiology 
will at last spread so that it will ta e 
ethics long . There are already traces 
enough of a new tendency- to treat ethics 
like physics . lO 
ietzsche expresses a similar ide when he says that the 
intellect is grant e d t o "the f eebler and least robust indi-
viduals since it has bee n denied them to fight the battle of 
existence with horns or the sharp teeth of beasts of prey . «ll 
For both these ~men then the path to man ' s salvation lay in 
the return to the experience of his existence rather than 
in the lifeless t.reatises of idealistic philosophy or the .moral 
platitudes of bourgeois Christianity . 
Taking up the themes be gun by ietzsche and Kierke a rd, 
specifically the alienation of man from the power of being and 
the resulting meaninglessness and dehumanization that this 
alienation creates, existentialist thin ers such as Jean Paul 
Sartre, Albert Camus, Martin Heidegger , and Paul Tillic h have 
through their own writings clarified and expanded these themes 
into an or anized field of thought and view of reality which 
challenges man to reawaken the power of his being and to ag in 
beco e fully human. 
The method of achieving this reaw kening to being differs 
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somewhat ·from one existentialist to another. · t~wever, the 
first stirrings are generally manifested as an experience of 
alienation from the normal world~ For Albert Camus this ex-
perience begins when a man senses the absurd; when that once 
familiar world somehow begins to feel &trange .and, as Camus 
saya, "all the knowledge on earth will give me nothing to 
aasure ·me th.at this· world is mine. n12 For Jean Paul Sartre 
the awakening occurs when a man r e alizes that he is a free 
consciousness confronting pure, brute matter and that in this 
situation he bears the sole responsibility for creating meaning 
and value in hia life. , Sartre powerfully rocreatea thia ex-
perience in his book lau1e1 : 
••• 1 was nowhere, l was floatin&. l was not 
surprised, l knew it was the world, the naked 
World auddenly revealio& itself, and l choked 
with raee at this gross, absurd being. You 
couldn't even wonder where all that sprang 
from, or how it was that1 lf(>rld come into existence, rather than nothin&ness. J 
Thia experience leaves the protagonist, Antoine Roquentin, a 
free man, stripped of all hia illuaiona and attachments to 
existence. tte says; 
l .am free: there is absolutely no more reason 
for living, all the ones l have tried h~ve 
given way and l can't imagine any more of them. 
My past is dead .•• I am alone in this white, 
garden-rimmed street. Alone fnd free. But this 
freedom i3 rather like death. 4 
Martin Heidegger, the German exiatential~st, states that it 
is the realization of death which bringa about man's awareness 
of freedom. For Heidegger, the presence of death can serve 
to drive man above what Margorie Grene calla "the distracting 
and deceivillg care of my day-by-day exiatence,·"1S thua enabling 
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him to becoae a free and creative bein& rather than a pro~ram-
med autoaaton. 
Modern exi•tentialiaa ia then, above all, the attempt 
to achieve the freedom inherent in human oonaciouaneaa. 
Conaequently, freedom for the existentialist ie the esaence 
of aan and truth. To violate this freedoa, either by eacaping 
from it or by depriving others of it is to be leae than huaan. 
Sartre expreaaes this clearly in his essay "ixiatentialiaa 
la a Huaani-." He atateaa 
••• there ia no deterainiam- man.-ia free, aan 
is freedom ••• man is condemned to be free.16 
For Ernest Hemingway and his generation World War l was 
the existential moment of truth. ln the mass death by machine 
gun and poison gas the veneer of a reasonable civilization 
was quickly stripped away, revealing the nothingness which 
underlies exiatence and forcing man to contemplate its meaning. 
The First World War, with its two million dead and twenty 
million maimed, made it horribly apparent to those who would 
see that so~ething waa fundamentally wrong with Western man. 
After the war men were no lonaer certain of theaaelvea or their 
place in the world. The war had opened in these men a loneli-
neaa and a aeaningleaanesa that many would spend thereat of 
their live• trying to overcome. Erich Remarque, author of 
All Quiet op the Western front, expreseea hia feelin&a about 
the war and the effect it had on his generation: 
How aenaeleaa ia everythin& that can ever be 
written, done, oi- thought when auch thine• are 
poaaible. lt must be all liea and of . no account 
when the culture of a thouaand years could 
not prevent thia streaa of blood from being 
poured out.17 
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ln this passage Remarque echoes the existentialist criticism 
of Western civiliaa.tion. For the hiator,. of Weatern civili-
zation ia the hiatory of the crowth of reaaon and Western 
culture ia built on the foundation of reason. But aa the 
exiat6ntialiata aaintain and Remarque's comaenta indicate, 
reaaon, no matter how well establiahed, cannot austain exiat-
ence because it ia unable to drive the uncertainty and inae-
curity from the huaan condition. Only by facina and takin& 
the uncertainty of exiatence into oneaelf, throuch and act of 
courage, can an authentic existence be achieved. 
irneat Heaincway, who waa on the· ltalian f~ont, deacribea 
an experience wbich auat have had a aiailar effect on hia 
attitu~• toward life. He statea in the atory "A Way lou'll 
}4ever ie": 
~icholaa Adaaa saw what had happened by the 
position of the dead. They lay alone and in 
cluapa in the hi&h araaa of the field and 
along the road, their pockets out, and over 
thea were fliea and around each bodJ or group 
of bodies were scattered papers ••• The hot 
weather had swollen them all alike recardleaa 
of nationality.18 
For a whole generation of young men who had experienced similar 
visions of death, the old bourgeoia values were stripped away, 
leaving thea free, though emo~ionally wounded, to diacover 
some new values by which they would be able to live. Remarque 
again expreaaea the feeling that many muat haye had after the 
war. He wrote: 
We had as yet taken no root. The war ewopf 
us away • . For the othere, the older aen, it 
is but an interruption. They are able to 
think beyond it. We, however, have been 
gripped by it and do not know what the end 
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may be. We know only that in some strange 
d 1 hol h b 1 d 19 an me anc y way we ave ecome a waste an ••• 
The ~eneration of which Remarque speaks could no lon~er believe 
in the world of their elders, the world of business and com-
placency and church on Sundays. A world where an authentic 
life is replaced by a world of preconceived, ~ell established, 
and blindly accepted values. The post war ~eneration broke 
away from these traditional values and set out to explore, 
probe, and discover the meaning of their . existence throu&h 
an evaluation of their own experience rather than through the 
preconcieved categories accepted by their elders. 
Out of thia exploration and probin& a new vision and 
conception of aan besan to emerge. It be&an in the Dadiat 
movement and in the aeemin& disorientation preeented in modern 
art. lt began to emerge in the literature of James Joyce, 
Ernest Hemingway, and ·r. S. Eliot. Finally it emer&ed as the 
foraulated philosophy of existentialism. William Uarrett 
in hia book !rratiopal Man speaks of the importance of exis-
tentialiaaa: 
ln our ,poch existential philosophy haa ap• 
peared as an intellectual expression of the 
time, aeQ . the philosophy exhibits oumerous 
points of contact with modern art. The more 
cloaely we examine the tW9 toaetber., the 
stronger becomes the impression that exis-
tential philosophy ia the authentic intel-
lectual expression of our time, as art is 
the expreaaion in term• of image and eJDOtion.20 
it is theae points of contact between art .and existential 
philoaophy, and in particular, the points of contact between 
modern exiatential philosophy and the worka of Ernest lleminA;Cway 
lJ 
which l wiah now to examine. 
ln the works of H8minaway we see in fleab and b!ood a 
portrayal of the existenti.al condition. A world whel"e the 
rational has been penetrated by the nonrational; by death antl 
nothinaneaa. .lt i.a a world, conaequently, where tr•aditional 
valuea no lon&er apply and where a m~n aust rely on himae.lf 
for creatinfC a aeaninaiful life. The world which Hemingway 
depicta ie oue fille~ with death and loneliness; one in which 
human beinae muet uae every ounce of courage to keep emotionally 
alive while 1110vinc into an uncertain future. 
The area which Heaingway aharea with exiatentiali .. ia 
in the interrelationship between the element• of death, free-
dom, value, and courage. These element• are aeen as eaaeotial 
for the development of an authentic life in both tteain&way 
and exiatential writinga. 
The firat of these elements which •hall be diacuaaed ia 
death and its relationahip to nothingneaa. Death for Heaingway 
and the exiatentiali•t• ia not an abatract 1concept referrin& 
to eome tiuture event, rather it aervea aa the aeana through 
which a aan concretely experiences the possibility of non-
beina. lt ia in this threat of non-beiina that a man realize• 
thab exiatence is not reaaonable and can never be contained 
by reaaon. Consequently, the concept of nothin&neea ia for 
exiatentialiana the firat principle of the philoaophy. John 
Killinger, in hie study of Hemingway and exiatentialiam, dis-
cusses the raeanin6' of uothin"nees in the followina: 
Mothinaneaa is a convenient designation for 
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the inexplicable weirdneaa that liea beyond 
the rational boundariea of existence ••• 
There ia really no adequate definition of 
nothingness, nor any coaplete understandina 
' 
of it ••• it continually threatens to annihilate 
man, to en&ulf and to snuff out his true existence.21 
Thi& nothingness or "inexplicable weirdness" that lies 
beyond the rational is for Hemingway,•• it is for the exia-
tentialiata, the fundamental experience. And while much of 
Hemingway's work deals with this experience and its conseQ\l~n~es 
he describe• the experience moat explicitly in ·the story "A 
Clean Well-Lighted Place." .ln this story an old man atays late 
at a cafe drinking brandy. Attending the cafe are two waiters. 
One is young, confiden~, and eager to get home to his wife. 
The other waiter is older and sympathetic to the old man's late 
night drinking. Through the conversation that the waiters 
hold, we find t.hat the old man has recently tried to commit 
suicide because he was in despair. The younger waiter can find 
no cause for the old man's despair since hi is supposed to be 
wealthy. The young wait~r finally loaes patience and will no 
longer serv~ the old man so he pays hia tab and leaves. The 
older waiter not.ea that the old man leaves wi~p. dignity. After 
the younger waiter leaves, the other conimenta on the value of 
a clean well-li5 htE:d place to spend· the eve.aings. ile puts it 
this way: 
'!'urning off the electric light he continued 
the conver~ation with himself. it is the 
li6'ht of course but it. is uecossavy t..hat the 
place be clean and pleasant ••• What did he fear? 
lt. was not. fear or clread • .Lt was a not,hin6' 
that he knew too well. It was all a nothing 
and a man was a noLhiu" t.oo. .1.t was only· that. 
15 
and light was all it.. needed, and a certain 
cleanliness and oruer. Soruc li ved in it and 
never felt it but he knew it was nada y pues 
nada, na~a y pues nada.22 
from the above example& l have tried to show that the experi-
' 
ence of nothingness is fun~amental to the work of l.Joth Uemin~-
way and the existentialists. this nothin~oess threatens man's 
existence in three basic ways, Fir&t of all it threatens free-
dom io the form of bad faith. Secondly, it threatens t,he crea-
tion of values ~in the form of meaninilessness. finally it 
threatens man in .the form of death. More shall be said later 
on the first two . forms .. of aopihilation, bl:lt now, as stated 
. .. .. . 
previously, lhe relationship between death and nothingness 
shall be discussed. For it is thr~u~h ~he. awareness of death 
that nothingness is most conc.retely e'fperienced. 
1n Death ln the Afternoon, his study of bullfighting, 
Heming way describes death as the fundamental experience and 
speaks of his desire to capture it in his writin~. lie states: 
'Ihe only place where you could see life 
and death, ie, violent death now that the 
wars were over, was in the bullrin~ and 
l wanted very much to ~o to Spain where 
l could study it. l was tryin£ to learn 
to write, commencin& with the simple•t 
things of all and the most fundamental is 
violent <leath ••• l had read many books in 
which, when the autl~r tried to convey 
it, he o n ly produced a blur, and 1 d e c ided 
that this was because either the auL, ,or 
had never seen it clearly or at the moment 
of it, he had physically or mentally shut 
his eyes.23 
Hemingway achieved the goal set forth in the above 
parag raph. In his fiction we see death by suicide, firing 
s q t.: a d , bombing, gunshot, goring, and childbirth. From his 
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earliest short stories, such as "lndian Camp," to his later 
work, like Across tt1e Riy\;r an<J into the 'l'rees,;: we a~e his 
characters confronting death. And it was in the confrontation 
with death that the awareneas of nothingneaa was born. 
However, the awareness of death aervea another function 
ueyond that of revealing nothing ness and nonratio.nal nature 
of existence. Death also is a revealer of man's freedom. 
ln the moment in which a man faces his extinction or nothingness, 
' . he is also opened t6 his freedom • . Marjorie Grene, in her 
book lntroguction 'tb,t~istentiali~@~ diacuasea the role which 
death plays in the thought of Martin Heidegger. She states: 
Yet it is only ~n such a resolve as limited 
by death- in the realization of my existence 
as essentially anu necessarily bein& to 
death- that 1 can rise out of the distracting 
and deceivin& care of my day-by-day existence 
and become authentically myaelf. Only in such 
recognition of radical finitude, in the ainkin" 
dread with which l face my own annihilation, 
can l escape the snare of a delusive present, 
to create, in a free resolve, a g~~uine future 
from a genuinely histori_cal past. 
William ~arrett makes a similar atatement in Irrational 
Only by taking death into myaelf according 
to Heidegger does an authent i c e >-i stence 
become possible for me. Touched by this 
interior angel of death, 1 cease to be the 
impersonal and social one among many, as ~ 
Ivan lllyich was, and 1 am free to become myself. 2~ 
From the above discussion we see that for Heidegger the aware-
ness of death opened the way for a man to rise above the tri-
vialities which constitute much of his life and to take his 
freedom and create a meaniµgful life. 
lu Albert . Camua! ,.. novel, The SttMD&~r, Meuraault, the 
17 
protagonist realizes the relationship between death and freedom 
when he is angered by a priest offering salvation shortly be-
fore his execution. Meursault understands that death has al-
ways been a present possibility and tha·t this presence is a 
source of f1•eedoa1 from all the ideological and emotional corn-
plexity that people live under. He describes death as a "slow 
persistent breeze." 
And on its way that breeze had leveled out 
all the ideas that people tried to foist 
on me in the equally unreal years l then 
was living throueh. What difference could. 
they make to me, the deaths of others, or 
a mother's love, or his God ••• Every man 
alive was privileged;there was only one class 
of men, the privileged class. Ail alike 
would be condemned to die ••• 26 
In the end Meursault realizes that existence needs no rational 
or prior justification. Life is good in itself and all men 
are privileged because all can be fr~~d Lhrough the awareness 
of death. 
Jean Paul Sar·Lre, while never explicitly statinG· that 
it is death whict1 is a revealer of freedom, nevertheless often 
illustrates tlae realization of freedom coming about in the 
face of death . .ln Sartre's 01aJor work Being and Nothio,iness 
freedom appears to a man who while walking along a precipice 
sees the possibility of death. Also in his novel The Keprieve, 
Mathew Delarue asserts his freedom when he decides not to 
commit suicide. He states: 
All hawsers cut, , .  nothing now could hold him 
back.: here was his freedom, and how horrible 
it was ••• Dizziness rose softly over the river; 
sky and bridee diaaolved: nothin& remained but 
himself and the water; it heaved up to him and 
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rippled round his dangling legs. The water, 
where his future lay. At the moment it is 
true, l'm going to kill myself. Suddenly 
he decided not to do it. He decided it 
shall be a =tria1.27 
The above exa~ples help to show that death serves as a path 
to freedom. Thia freedom which is revealed through death, 
however, is an anguished freedom. : lndeed, for the existential-
iat, anguish is the underlying condition of freedom. Anguish 
is born of the realization that one's freedom and values are 
solely dependent on oneself. A man muat constantly through 
courage, recreate hie freedom because nothing ~uaranteea the 
validity of the valuea which he c·c:hooses. Marjorie Grene 
elaborates on the relationship between freedom and murage 
in the following: 
Freedom reveals itself rather, when w~ screw 
up our courage to see it without pretense, in 
the dizzying collapse of external sanctions 
and universal laws, in the appalling conscious-
ness that I, and l alone, have, absurdly and 
without reason, brought order out of chaos; 
that l alone, crudely and stupidly, without 
cosmic meanin& or rational ground, have made 
a world out of nothing: and with that awareness 
my world itself totters on the ~Bink of the 
nothing ness from which it came. 
l think the first evidence we have that the experience 
.../ 
of death serves to reveal freedom for the Hemingway protagon-
ist .is found in t he collec tion In Our Time. ln the short nar-
rative beginning chapter Vl Nick Adams and his friend Renaldi 
have been wounded in an assault on a to·wn in the t'irat World 
War. With this wounding Nick Adams beg in• to realize his 
freedom. He says · to Renaldi: 
Nick turne d his head and looked down at 
K.enal<li. "Senta K.enaldo; Sent a. You and 
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me we've made a separate peace. We're not 
patriots.29 
With the wounding, ~ick Adams has realized death and with that 
realization comes the beg inning of freedom. ln telling Re naldi 
that they had now made a separate p e ace and that they were no 
longer patriots Nick had taken t hat first step away from tradi-
tional values and the first step into alienation and the be-
g inning of existential consciousness. 
The awaken·i ng of this consc iousness and its attendant 
ali e nation is c ontinued in the stories "Soldie~s Home" and 
"ln Anot her Country." In both stories we see the implications 
of the "separate peace" theme begun in the other episode. 
ln "Sodier•s Home", llarold Krebs has returned from the 
war to his home in Oklahoma. liefore the war he attended a 
small Methodist college and was a member of a fraternity. 
But now, after the war, things hav e chan~e d fo1· hi m. Krebs 
no longer lives in the same world that othe rs live in. ln 
speaking of the g irls in the town and the life they lead he 
states: 
ffe liked the girls that we re walking along 
the other side of t he street. He liked the 
looks of them much better than the French 
g irls or German girls. But the world they 
were in was not the world he was in.30 
Later when his mother is pressing him about finding a job 
she tells him, "God has some work for everyone to do. There 
can be no idle hands in Hie kingdom." Krebs responds to this 
by saying, , "I'm not in His kinedom." 
Krebs c•n no longer accept this world and its conventions, 
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because he, like Nick Adams, had experienced death and was 
forced to make a separate peace. 1he implications of this 
peace are that Krebs now stands alone and must accept the 
responsibility of his freedom. He can no loneer be like the 
other boys who will lose themselvea in the community. As 
his mother says: 
Th& boys are all settling down; they're 
all determined to get somewhere; you can see 
that boys like Charley Simmons are on their 
way to being really a credit to the community.31 
But for Kreba the traditional attitudes towards work, dating 
nice girls, and attending church no lonaer apply. Kreb• is 
in the same position which we find many existential heroes in, 
a position of alienation and separation from society. 
ln the story "in Another Countr/ " the main character 
is in the hospital after being wounded in the war. His knee 
has been crippled, and he comes with the other young men to 
the hospital each day to sit at machines which are supposed 
to rehabilitate their broken bodies. liut there is a fundamental 
change in these men that rehabilitation can never alter. They 
have all made a separate peace. Each has lost physically that 
part which held him to society. The main character has lost 
the knee that enabled him to play football. The major, whc 
had been a fencer, had crippled his hand. The boy who came 
from a very old family had lost his nose, and in rebuilding 
his face they could not get the noae quite right. These wounds 
are symbols of the psychological alienation that these men 
felt as a result of their confrontation with death. These 
wounds symbolize their death to society. The protagonist 
comments o n their alienation in the following : 
~he tall boy with a very pale face who was 
to l>e a lawyer had been a lieutenant of Arditi 
and had three medals of the sort we each had 
only one of. ,ie had lived a very long time 
with death and was a .litLle •:let ached. We were 
all a little detached, and there was nothing 
that held us together except that we met every 
afternoon at the hospita1.J2 
Although nothing held thelil together, when confronted by society 
at larg e they felt differently • 
.•• and sometimes having to walk into the street 
when the men and women would crowd tog ether on 
the sidewalk so that we would have had to jostle 
them to get by, we felt held together by there 
being something that ha<l happened that they1 the people who disliked us, did not understand.Jj 
From these exemples we see the effect that . the i"irst World 
War had on these characters. This process of alienation is 
also continued in llenling way 's two early novels A 1' areweJ;l to 
Arm§ and The Sun AJ.so Rises. 
in the beginning of A t'arewell to Arms 1-'rederick Henry 
has no understanding of the relationship bet.ween life and death 
which the existentialists find so important for an authentic 
life. for example, before henry is wounded he gives an account 
of the life he enjoyed; a life of irresponsil>le hedonism • 
.lnstead of going to the mountains he says: 
l had gone to no such· place but to the smoke 
of cafes and nights when the room whirled 
and you needed to look at the wall to make 
it stop, nights in bed drunk, when you knew that 
that was all there was, and the strange excite-
01ent of waking and not knowing who it was 
with you, and the world al·l · unreal in the 
dark and so exciting that you must resume 
again not knowing and not caring in the night, 
sure that this was all and all and all and not caring .34 
' ' .. ' 
However, after he is blo~n up by a trench mortar, death 
becomes a reality to him. During the retreat of Caparetto 
he deserts t.he army when he realizes that he is going to be 
shot as a German infiltrator. At this point Henry makes his 
separate peace with the war. He says: 
i had taken off the stars, but that was for 
convenience. it was no point of honor. l 
was not against them. l was through. l 
wished them all the luck. There were the good 
ones, And the brave ones, and the calm ones, 
and the sensible ones, and they deserved it. 
But it was not my show any more ••• 35 
At, the end of the novel when his wife and child haye died 
Henry's alienation is comple t e and h-e make s t hi;s b i t ter ~tate-
ment against society: 
That was what you did. You died. Iou did 
not know i.-hat it was about. You never had 
time to learn. they threw you in and told 
you the rules and the first time they caught 
you off base they killed you ••• Stay arounJ 
and they would kill you.30 
l said earlier that existential freedom ia anguished 
freedom because of the realization that one's freedom and 
values depend solely on oneself and there is absolutely nothing 
which g uarantees the validity of these values or the continu-
ance of freedom. Con.seq) ently., a man may try to escape from 
this freedom because he cannot endure the an&uish of free choice. 
lt is the cou~ai.e9us .ac~~etance ~f .freedom rathe r than its 
rejection that separates the existential hero from other men. 
l.t is in this position that we leave Frederick Uenry., .Nick 
Adams., and Krebe. Although Adams, Krebs, and Henry have been 
set free via their conrrontation with death, they have not 
as yet asserted this freedom to create an authentic life. 
Consequently in these stories, and particularly in A farewell 
to Arms, we are left with a nihilistic rather than an existen-
tial view. However, in The Sun Also ~, ises, we can see a move-
ment beg inning which goes beyond nihilism to an existential 
position which Paul Tillich calls "the courage to be." This 
concept of courag e is, l believe, the third necessary element 
for an authentic existential position. Although a man may 
experience nothingness and in t urn experience his freedom he 
cannot be considered exist ential llnt.i.l he manifests t.he courage 
to assert his freedom. This is what rlcnry, Adams, and Krebs 
have y e t to do. 
'fillich defines courage "as the self affirmation of being 
in spite of nonbeing." The two aspects of this courage which 
he discusses provide a clear parallel to the ideas that Heming-
~ .. 
way expresses most fully in The Sun Also Rises and for Whom 
the Bell 'folls as well as some of the short stories. 'l'he two 
aspects of courage which Tillich defines are "the courage to 
be as oneself" and "the courag e to be as part" of the human 
community. Tillich says of the self: 
But the self is self only oecause it has a 
world, a structured universe, to which it 
belongs .,and ;·.fromi whict1 . it . is separated at. 
the same time. Self and world are correlated, 
and so are individualization and participation.37 
In The Sun Also Rises we see a portrayal, int.he person 
of Jake "arnes, of the courage to b~ as on~self. l'he need 
for this type of courage was a result of the realization o f 
death and suffering experienced in= the war. Ihe war, stripping 
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away as it did, the veneer of a rational civilization, left 
men like J ake K.arnee, Frederick iienry, and the others physically 
and psychologically wounded and rendered them incapable of 
believing in any social commitment. Gonsequently, they all 
live in a state of alienation which has been represented in 
the idea o f the separate peace. However, if one is to live 
with this alienation one needs courage; courage to live despite 
the despair, lone liness, and me ani,1glessness that one feels 
all around; courage to move forward and to try to create some 
values by which to live. 
However, because one can no longer believe in such g rand 
and vague values as a loving God, or in patriotism, .:>r in the 
striving for social status , one must necessarily begin with 
one's own being a• the foundation of values. 1heae values, 
moreover, must be derived from and consistent with the reality 
of one's own concrete, subjective experience ; experie nce which 
has been stripped of all sentimentality and romance, leaving 
only what is truly felt rather than what one thinks should 
be felt. Jean Paul Sartre expresses a similar view in the 
following quote from his essay "Existentialism ls a Humanism." 
.•• but if I have excluded God the Father, 
there must be somebody to invent values. We 
have to take things as they are. And moreover, 
to say that we invent values means neither 
more nor less than this; that there is no 
sense in life a priori. Life ia nothing until 
it is lived; but it is yours to make sense of 
and the value of it is nothing else but the 
sense you choose.3~ 
Sartre continues this line of thought when he states: 
It folluws that my freedom is the unique 
foundation of values an<l Lhal nvthing, 
absolutely nothing, justifies rue in adopt-
ing this or that parLicular value, this or 
that particulal' scale: of values ••• My freedom 
ia an&uished at ueing the foundation of values 
while itself without foundatiou.39 
Consequently the next step b~ycnd death and freedom which 
the existential h~ro must take is toward the courage to be 
as onesa lf which manifests itself in the creation of values 
i:Jy which to live. 
In TL.'::' Stm Al so Kises we see an example of this attempt 
to discover and sustain values when Jake discusses philosophies 
which have all soonc-::r or later dissolved into the void which 
underlies his life. Jake puts it this way: 
Enjoying living was learning to get your 
money'·s worth. 'l'he world was a good place 
Lo huy in. It seemed like a fine philosophy. 
ln five years, 1 thought, it 11till aeeut j u-=>t 
as silly as all th~ other fine philosophies 
1 had. 
Perhaps that. wasn't true though. Pe.d1aps 
as you went along youJ did lt=arn something. l 
did not care what lt waa all about. All l 
wa11,ted to know was how to live ia it. l'iaybe 
if you found out how to live in it you learned 
from that what i -~ was -all about. 40 
By what values, then, do Jake and the oti1er characters attempt 
to live by? What makes lhem CAistential? 
Jake lives, af~~r the war, as an expatriate reporter 
in Paris. His life is scar.red by :i condition of impotence 
which was the result of a wound sustained while flying over the 
Italian front. Jake, like Frederick Henry, l-4ick Adams, and 
the others has beeu wouuded by t.he war and like the others 
kas made a sep•rate peace. His life is characterized by an 
attempt to keep thlngs simple; to kee p his pet·ception clean 
in order that he may clearly understand his fee.lings. Thia 
desire for simplicity rather than complexity is also seen in 
"Soldier's Home" when tl.rebs says at the end of the story that 
"he had tried so to keep his life from being complicated ••• 
He wanted his life to go smoothly.n41 l. believe that this 
concept of simplicity is one of the key values which Jake and 
the other characters develop as part of thtir post war philo-
sophy. This concept of the simple versus the comple~ . is, as 
John Killinger notes, "similar to the divisions made by many 
of the existentialists. lt corresponds to the vital-comic 
antithesis of Kierke~aard, to the authentic-unauthentic of 
Heidegger, and to the sincerity-bad faith dialectic of Sartre."42 
The meaning of an unauthentic life or a life lived in bad 
faith is given by william liarrett in speaking of Heidegger's 
concept of "the one." .He states: 
None of us is yet even a Self. We are each 
simply one ao1ong · many; a uanae among the names 
of our schoolfellows, our fellow citizens, our 
community. The everyday public quality of our 
existence iieideg·ger calls "the one. n 'l he One 
is the impersonal an<l public creature whom each 
of us is even ~efore he is an I, a real i. One 
has such-and-such a position in life, one is 
expected to behave in such-and-such a manner ••• 
So long as we remain in the womb of this exter-
nalized and pu blic exist ence we are spared the 
terror and the dig nity of becoming a Self.43 
Jake, Bill~ 3rett, Count Meppopopolous, and Harris h&ve all 
broken free froM the maas of men and are now att~mpting to 
create authentic selves. As stated, the key to this authentic 
being is simplicity. These people must return to a simpler 
s§'stem of values and a simpler way of knowing those values 
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because the war in a ll its complexit y had the ironic ·effect 
o f returning e xist ence back to i ts basic s i t ua~ iou of b e ing 
and nothingness. We are remind e d o f the passag e quoted earlie r 
from All Quiet On t pe western f ront with regard to the effect 
civilization's complexity had on Remarque. He stated: 
.It muat be all lies and of no account when 
the c ulture o f a t housand years could not 
prev,~t this stream of blood being poured 
out. 
What Jake and the other existential hero e s share in t he aliena-
tion of the separat e peace is a rej ection of the moral and 
social complexit ies of civilization and a return to an e p is-
temology based oo senses and fe e ling s. This idea i s stated 
ne~r the end of the book when Brett tells Jake about her fe e l-
ing s. She says: 
xou know it wakes one feel rathe r good deciding 
not to be a bit ch ••• it•s sort of what we have 
instead of God.45 
In other words the source of values is no longer to be found 
beyond man's existence, but rather, for thes e people, value s 
aust come from their own sense s and f e elings. So we f i n d i n 
He ming way the rejection of s e ntimentality and intellectuali sn1 
because these elements can only complicate and pollute the 
basic senses. Evidence indicating this place ment of values 
on one's own senses and the rejection of false emotion i s found 
in the scene when Brett, Jake, and the Count are having cham-
• I 
pagne together. Brett has told Jake earlier that the Count 
is "quite one of us." In this scene we see why. The Count 
has been in war arid revolutions and shows t he scars to prove 
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it. He explains his values to Jake in the following: 
You see Mr. Barnes, it is because l have 
lived very much that now 1 can enjoy every-
thing eo well. Don't you find it like that ••• 
That is the aecret. rou must get to know the 
values.46 
Brett then aaka a aignificant question: 
"Doesn't anythine ever happen to vur values?" 
Urett asked. "No. Not any more." 
At dinner Jake comments that "food had an excellent place 
in the Count's values. So did wine. 1148 The Count is one of 
them because he has made the journey from the unauthentic to 
the authentic. His valuea are simple, and he maintains that 
basic simplicity of sense and feeling by keeping free of un-
necessary emotional complications. When Brett suggests that 
they toast someone with the champagne the Count has brought he 
tells her: 
Thia wine is too eood for toast drinking, my 
dear. You don't ~ant to mix emotions up with 
a wine like that.4~ 
The values inherent in an authentic life are also rep-
resented in the aficionado, a peraon who is passionate ~bout 
bullfights. It ia intereatin& to note that Americans were not 
considered good candidate• for bullfighting. Jake, however, 
was an exception. When he meets Montoya, the hotel owner, 
Jake coQUllents that: 
He always smiled ~s thouah bullfightin& were 
a very special secret between the two of us; 
a rather shocking but really very deep secret 
that we knew about • . l.le always smiled a• though 
there were somethin& lewd about the secret to 
outsiders, but that it waa something that we 
underatoode50 
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When Jake ia introduced to some other aficionados he describes 
their reaction: 
They were always very polite at first, and 
it amused them very muc h that I should be an 
American. Somehow it was taken for &ranted 
that an American could not have aficion. He 
might simulate it or confuse it with excitement, 
but he could not really have it. When they 
saw that I had aficion, and there was no 
password, no ~•et questions that could bring 
it out, rather it waa a sort of oral spiritual 
exaainattyn ••• they wanted to touch you to make 
certain.} · 
What unites the aficionado is their understanding that 
in the ritual of the bullfight existence is reduced to its 
basic elements; a man, alone, confronting death, armed only 
with his courage, Hemingway describes the p•iloeophy of the 
a f icionado in Death in t he Afternoon: 
They know death is the unescapable reality, the 
one thine any man may be sure of; the only 
aecurity; that it transcends all modern com-
forts and that with it you do not need a bath-
tub in every American home, not when you have 
it, do you need the radio. They think a great 
deal about death and when they have a religion 
they have one which belie ves that life is much 
shorter than death. Having this feeling they 
tale an intelligent interest in death and when 
they can aee it being &iven, avoided, refused, 
and accepted in the afternoon for a nominal price 
of admiaaion they pay their money end go to the 
bullrin&, continuing to eo even when •.• they are 
moat often ar~!•tically disappointed and emotional-
ly defrauded. 
In the final sentence Hemingway comments on the authentic and 
emotional disappointment that the aficionado feels at a bad 
bullfight without aficion rather than an authentic one . Pedro 
Romero is a bullfighter with aficion. He does not def r aud t he 
aficionado. "Romero," aays Jake, "had the old thing, t he holding 
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of his purity of line through the maximum of exposure.»53 Jake 
says the other bullfighters "twisted themselves like corkscrews, 
their elbows raised ••• to give a faked look of danger.»54 We 
get the feeling from this that complexity is perhaps a character-
istic of the unauthentic and cowardly life. Romero, however, 
avoids all of these complex movements. He "never made any con-
tortions, always it was straight and pure and natural in line."55 
Romero further demonstrates his style and courage through a &UC'!" ··· 
ceasful performance in the bullring after having been badly beaten 
up by Cohn • . In other words, what the aficionado appreciates 
and what Romero provides is the union of simplicity, style, and 
courage in the face of death. The man who understands the courage 
to be as oneaelf must perform in this way. Not to do so would 
threaten the valuea which he lived by and would lead to an un-
authentic life. S e en in this perspective the bullfight is a 
dramatization of the courage to be aa oneself and manifests the 
values of simplicity and courage which are the key elements for 
an authentic life. 
But, in contrast, Ibft Sun Also Rises contains portraits 
of unauthenticity. Early in the book Robert Cohn's friends, 
the Braddocka, are presented as boring, foolish people, Jake 
says that Mre. Braddock "in the excitement of talking French 
was liable to have no idea of what she was saying.n56 Later 
i n the novel, when Jake and Bill Gorton are on their way to Spain 
they meet some American tourists and a group of Americans on a 
pilgrimage to Rome. These peo~le are also presented as examples 
of unauthenticity. The American tourist, in speaking of the 
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pilgrims, saya to Jake: 
They've got seven cara of them from Dayton, 
Ohio. '!'hey'v• been on pil&rimaae to k.ome, 
and now they're tLoin~ to l>iarrltz antl i.ourde•.57 
But the American is little btttter off than the pilgrims. His 
conversation with J~ke and ilill is a babble about travellio& 
while you're youn& an<l se~ing America firat. t.ven some i>ullfighters 
. 
are presented as being 11co11U11ercial". Jake saye that the bullf.i.ghters 
with aficion etayed at Montoya's hotel while the commercial bull-
fighters stayed once, but did not co~e back. 
The greater counterpoint .t.o the authentic life, however, 
is Robert Cohn. Cohn ia an ironic figure in the book. His 
suffering is a fantasy in which he indulgea, and ia nothing 
like the real sufferin& which Jake endures. Cohn understands 
nothing about the anauiah of freedom and the neceaaity to 
become a Self. It ia becauae he does not underatand the con-
ditions of existence that he behaves badly. He livea with the 
romantic ideas of goin& to South America and refuaea . to believe 
that Brett would marry aomeone ahe didn't love. 'throughout 
the novel Cohn moona after Brett like a lovesick adolescent 
because he cannot believe hia ahort time with Urett did not 
'• 
mean anythina. brett finally tella Jake th&t ahe hatea Cohn'• 
. suffering. She hatea Cohn'• aufferioa because it ia not real. 
lt ia a suffering baaed on what Cohn think• he should feel 
rather than what ia truly felt. 
ln The Sun Al19 Ri111, then,we have• portrayal of the 
couraee to be•• oneself, a man atandioa alone in freedom 
32 
attempting to create values while confronting the emptiness 
which underlies his being. I have tried to show that the•e 
values are, of necessity, simple values based on •ense and 
feeling rather than on the complexities of intell~ctual epecu-
lation. However, although a man may, by asserting the courage 
to be as oneself, create an authentic self, the problem still 
remains of integrating that Self back into the world. 
In the worka of Hemingway diacusaed so far we have first 
seen the stripping away of the unauthentic aelf; the moveme nt 
away from the one like many about which Heidegeer speaks. 
In The Sun Also Rioes Hemingway defines, in Jake and the others 
we have discussed, the· nature of the authentic self and this 
definition parallels Tillich's concept of the courage to be 
as oneself. In the wor~a which will now be discussed, 1 believe 
Hemingway goes beyond the courage to be as oneself to what 
Tillich calls the courage to be as part. 
The "courage to be aa part" is a higher form of the cour-
age to be because, while demanding the courage to be as one-
self it also demands the .participation of this self in the 
world. I quote again the paasage about the aelf of Tillich's:: 
But the self is self only because it has a 
world, a structured universe, to which it 
belongs and from which it is separated at 
the aaae time. Self and world are correlated, 
and ao are individualizatimn and participation. 
For thia ia juat what participation aeana, 
beina a part of aoaething from which one is, 
at the same tiae separated.ss 
It is this attempt at participation which Heainawa7 discuss~~ 
in For Whoa the Bell Tolla. Robert Jordon, an American pro-
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fessor, joins the Communist forces as a dynamiter during the 
Spanish Civil War. At the beginning of hia aervice Jordon 
found a gr~at fulfillment in his participation and seemed on 
his way to a commitment to Coaununism, He deecribes his feeling 
as a one of communion in the following: 
You felt, in spite of a bureaucracy and inef-
ficiency and party strife something that was 
like the feeling you expected to have and did 
not have when you made your first com.raunion, 
lt was a feeling of consecration to a duty 
toward all of the oppressed of the world ••• 
lt gave you a part in something that you could 
believe in wholly and completely and in which 
you felt an abaolute brotherhood with the others 
who were engaaed in it.59 · 
However, after a year of fighting, Jordon'• sense of communion 
becomes corrupted and be«ins to diaaolve in the violence and 
brutality of the war. Jordon gradually rejects communism as 
a method of achieving the courage to be a part because he can-
not believe that the collective has more reality than the in-
dividual. The main cause of thia force which prevents Jordon's 
commitment to Communism ia the problem of cuilt. Jordon, 
because he is part of a group, muat now not only accept per-
sonal guilt, but also he JllUSt accept reaponaibility for actions 
committed by the group. The only way for Jordon to alleviate 
hia guilt would be to rationalize the killing as a political 
necessity. Although he tries, he ia unable to do so. He says: 
1 believe in the people and their right to 
govern themselves aa they wiah. 8ut you 
mustn't believe in killing, he told himself. 
You must do it as a necessity but you muat 
not believe in it, lf you believe in it the 
whole thing ia wrong. 
But how many do you suppose you have killed? ••• 
More than twenty. And of those how many were 
\ 
' ; 
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real fascists ? Two that 1 am sure of ••• l have 
to keep you straight in your head. Becauae if 
you are not absolutely straight in your head 
you have no right to do the things you do for 
a l l of them are crimes and no man has the right 
to take another man'• life unleea it ia to pre-
vent something worse happening to other people. 60 
But in another conversation with himself Jordon admits his 
pleasure in killing. He says: 
Stop maki ng dubious literature about the 
Berbora and the old Iberians and admit that 
you have liked to kill as all who are soldiers 
by choice have enjoyed i t at aoae time whether 
they lie about it or not 1 •• You have been tainted 
with it a long time oow.ol 
It is becauae of this taint of piilt from too auch ~illin& 
that Jordon muat reject communist ideology. Although he de-
sires to participate in the world he cannot do ao to the ex-
tent called for by the Collllllunist collective because he cannot 
place the reality of the collective before that of the indi-
vidual. Tillich atatea that : 
A collec tivist eociety is one in which the 
existence and life of the individual are 
determined by the exiateoce and institutions 
of the group. ln collectivist societ i es the 
courage of the individual is the courage to 
be as part.62 
What Hemingway is saying in For Whom the Bell Toll@, 
and which is consistent with existentialiSJD is that the life 
o f t he individual with its plenitude of concret e experie~ce 
transcends a rationally devised political and soc ial syRtem. 
The participation that J ordon seeks is inde ed one of brother-
hood with his fellow men, but it is not the brotherhood of 
COdlJllunism. Perhaps the key to the kind of participation that 
Jordon seeks is in the sermon by John Donne f~o~ whic h the title 
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of the book ia taken. The key part of the sermon is in the laat 
few lines: 
••• any man's death diminishes me, because 1 
am involved in Mankinde : and therefore never 
send to kgo~ for whom the bell tolls; it tolls 
for thee. 3 
This sermon echoes Meursault's statement oear the end of The 
Strang~r. l quote: 
Every man alive was privileged; there was 
only one cla•s of men, the privileged claaa. 64 
~11 alike would be condemned to die one day ••• 
The kind of brotherhood which Jordon discovers is the 
union of those in the existential situation. lt ia a brother-
hood which maintains both the courage to be as oneself and the 
courag e to be as part. But the courage to be as part is not a 
political or societal participation, rather it is a realization 
of a participation in the human condition; a condition which con-
tains &11 experience; love, death, courage, fear, and cowardice. 
Indeed, the fact that Jordon fights, now, with the poorly organize d 
guerrillas reflects his attitude toward the regimentation and 
anonymity of large scale military operation. The eventa Jordon 
experiences in the mountains, his love for Marie, the death of 
Sordo, the cowardice of Pablo and the courage of Anselmo are 
meaningful not because they are means to a political end, but 
because they are the fundamental elements of human experience. 
It is the meaninefulness of these experiences in themaelvea that 
Jordon must affirm. With this type of affirmation then, Jordon 
maintains the existential position in a more encompassing way 
than the earlier Hemingway characters who were concerned with 
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the problem of developing a self which could llv~ the existential 
condition. Jordon understands the condition and haa developed 
the courage to be a self. The problem was to develop the positive 
aspect of this condition, namely, the cour~ge to participate 
with others in the same situation and to see it as the basis of 
an authentic life for all men. 
With thia discovery of the self and the realization that 
what one shares with others is the existential condition Heming-
way has found the basis for participation. ~n the movement 
from the coura&e to be as oneeelf to the couraae to be aa part 
Hemingway has elevated the existential view, which aaa before 
only an individual proceas, to a universal position. Aod 
courage is the force which enables the individual to move 
from aelf 5aaer*"-ion to participation. 
So far then ~e have discussed the couraae to be aa oneself 
and the couraee to be as part. ln the formee~ coura&e ia called 
for to create an authentic self after the realization that 
' ' 
one is a bein& toward death and therefore potentially free. 
In the latter couraee ie necessary to move this self back 
into & participation with one•& fellow beinga. 
But what ia the source of couraee itaelf? Tillich states 
that courage ia rooted in the power of being and that this 
power of be.in& "is greater than the power of oneself anl.l the 
power of one'• world.n6S Thia means that the power of being 
haa a transeendent quality because "reli&ion," atatea Tillich, 
"ia the state of being araaped by the power of being iteelf.u66 
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This b r i ngs us to the r e ligious aspect o f Hemingway's 
~ 
work the key to which is found, I believe, in the concept of 
courage as it relates to the powe r of be ing. Consequently, 
1 think Hemingway's work may t o some d egree reflect a theistic 
existential position of the type presented by Tillich. 
ln the final section of his book, T~e Courage To Be, 
Tillich discusses the courage to be as the key to being itself. 
He states: 
The courage to be in all its forms has, by 
itaelf, revelatory character. It shows the 
nature of being, it shows that the self 
aff irmation of being i• an affirmation that 
overcomes negation ••• lf we speak of the power 
of being-itself we indicate that being affirms 
itself against nonbeing ••• nonbeing drives being 
out of its aecluaiog& it forces it to affirm 
itself dynamically. I 
The courage to affirm being in the face of negation runs 
throughout Hemingway's work, Hemingway's characters overcome 
the negation of death, the hegation of bad faith, meaningless-
ness and guilt. 
Perhaps the purest expression of the coura~e to be aa 
the key to being is in The Old Man agd the Sea. Santiago's 
ordeal is the story of a man's assertion of a type of courage 
whi c h transcend& defeat and asserts the power of being itself. 
Early in the book it is said of the old man that "he was too 
simple to wonder when he had attained humility. But he knew 
he had attaine d it and he knew it was not disgraceful and it 
carri ed no loss of true pride."68 The old man can maintain 
true pride a n d remain humble bec ause he understands that the 
key to man's being is couraee. Throughout the novel Santiagots 
courage is . stressed as in the following: 
Everything about him was old except hie eyes 
and they were the same cqlor as the sea and were 
cheerful and undefeated.69 
After he has hooked the fiah San~ia&o thinks to himself: 
But! will show him what a man can do and 
what a man endures.70 
Then near the end of the novel is the often quoted statement: 
But man is not made for defeat. A man can 
be destroyed but not defeated.71 
The Old Man and ~he Sea seems to correspond to the role 
of courage as Tillich defines it. Tillich states that "coura&e 
participates in the self-affirmation of being in itself, it 
participates in the power of being which prevails against 
nonbeing .•• ln the act of the courage to be the power of being is 
effective in us, whether we recognize it or not. Every act 
of courage is a manifestation of the ground of being ••• 72 
Santiago remains undefeated, even though the fish is lost 
to the sharks, because of his courage. For Santiago there 
is nothing else. Courage is the aourae of a man's actions 
in life and it ia the essence of participation in bein&. To 
maintain courage is to affirm being and the affirmation of 
being is a religious act. Tillich states: 
There are no valid arguments for the exis-
tence of God, but there are acts of courage 
in which we affirm the power of being, whether 
we know it or not ••• Courage has revealing power, 
the courage to be is the key to being itself.73 
I think the above quotation expresses Hemingway's over-
all philosophy of existence. What matters in existence is not 
' \ 
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the quality of a man's reason, but the quality of being. A 
man's values must stem from feeling not from speculation, for 
only by being in touch with one's feelings can a man have some 
real certainty about his actions. For Hemingway and for the 
existentialists, feeling is the reality of existence and courage 
is the assertion of being. Courage, for Jake, Jordon, and 
Santiago, in all its manifestations, ia an assertion of the power 
of being and the power of being is the source of the religious 
impulse. 
courage is stresses as in the following: 
Everything about him was old except his eyes 
and they were the same color as the sea and were 
cheerful and undefeated.69 
After he has hooked the fish Santiago thinks to himself: 
But I will show him what a man can do and 
what a man endures.70 
Then near the end of the novel is the often quoted statement: 
But mania not made for defeat A man can 
be destroyed but not defeated.,1 
The Old Man and the S~a seems to correspond to the role 
of courage aa Tillich defines it. Tillich states that "courage 
participates in the self-affirmation of being in itself, it 
participates in the power of being which prevails against 
nonbeing ••• In the act of the courage to be the power of being is 
effective in ua, whether we recognize it or not. Every act 
of courage is a manifestation of the ground of beina ••• 12 
Santiago remains undefeated, even though the fish ia lost 
to the sharks, because of his courage. For Santia&o there 
is nothing else. The essence of participation in life is courage. 
Courage is the source of the authentic man's actions. And in 
these acts of courage the power of being is manifested. To 
maintain courage is to affirm being and the affirmation of 
being is a religious a c t because it manifests the power of being 
iteelf. Tillich states: 
There are no valid arguments for the exis-
tence of God, but there are acts of courage 
in which we affirm the power of being, whether 
we know it or not ••• courac:e has revealin& pow,s· 
the courage to be i~ the k e y to b~ing itself. 
39 
I think the above quotation expresses the essence of Heming-
way's philosophy. What matters in existence is not the quality 
of a man'• reaaon~ but the quality of his being. And the quality 
of being is dependent upon the assertion of courage to overcome 
the ne~ations of euilt, meaninglessness, and death. When a man 
grounds himself in courage, he gains individual a uthenticity 
because he haa accepted the responaibility of his existence. 
Secondly, he gains participation in the human community because 
all men, knowingly or unknowingly, are atruggling with the cour-
age to be. Finally, through participation in the courage to be 
a man gains a religious or transcendent participation because 
t he assertion of courage is also an assert ion of the power of 
being. Courage, for Jake, Jordon , and Santiago, in all its mani-
festation_, is, ultimately, an assertion of the power of being 
and the power o.f being is the ~ urce of the religious impulse. 
For Hemingway and the existentialt•ts this inexplicable being 
and its assertion through courace are the cor.neratonea of man's 
life. 
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